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ABSTRACT
Theory indicates that internally-differentiated professional partnerships can promote matching between
heterogeneous consumers and professionals, particularly when consumers have imperfect information
or markets have barriers to referrals between firms. We test this in obstetrics markets, relying on random
assignment of patients to physicians to generate unbiased measures of a physician's treatment style
and skill, and on simulations to measure a physician's specialization. Consumers match to professionals
along all three dimensions -- specialization, style and skill -- based on consumers' observed characteristics
and unobserved preferences. We conclude that internally-differentiated partnerships promote matching
in ways that improve consumers' welfare and health.
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I.  Obstetrics Markets 
 
Many theoretical models of professional service partnerships have been developed to 
understand better the formation of such firms, their boundaries and their scopes. These models 
have focused on the benefits to the professionals or firms themselves. For example, partnerships’ 
profit-sharing can effectively spread the risk of demand shocks across the members (Gaynor and 
Gertler 1995). Alternatively, Chou (2007) proposes that human-capital intensive firms merge to 
establish a single brand identity that obfuscates the individual market value of the individuals or 
firms within the larger firm. The rationale for mergers between firms in this model is the merged 
firm’s ability to capture more of the investment in human capital such as knowledge, skill, or 
specialization. Other models have considered the ability of partnerships to signal higher quality to 
consumers in markets where quality is not readily observable, which they achieve by screening 
out low-quality professionals through their hiring decisions (Levin and Tadelis 2002) or by 
creating incentives for members to invest in quality-improving human capital (Morrison and 
Wilhelm 2004).  
Other theoretical models have focused on the advantages of firms with heterogeneous 
workers. Firms with specialized workers can coordinate their production (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972; Garicano 2000; Hart and Moore 2005), facilitate the flow of information among specialists 
(Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), and match them with the most appropriate tasks (MacDonald 
1982). In professional services markets, “tasks” can refer to individual, heterogeneous customers. 
The welfare implications of product differentiation in markets with heterogeneous consumers 
depend on the ability of consumers to match with products. In markets with imperfect or 
asymmetric information, firms can facilitate matching of consumers with goods and services by 
reducing consumers’ search and diagnosis costs (Wolinsky 1993) or by eliminating or reducing 
disincentives to refer consumers (Garicano and Santos 2004). In Garicano and Santos (2004), 
under many but not all conditions, professional partnerships create incentives for within-firm 4 
referrals that enhance matching between specialists and uninformed consumers beyond those 
achieved through (post-diagnosis) spot markets or (pre-diagnosis) retainer contracts between 
professionals in different firms.  
In this paper we empirically consider the consumer benefits from firms of professionals 
who are differentiated in specialization, style and skill. We study these effects conditional on the 
existing makeup of firms rather than testing the various models that explain the organization of 
professionals into firms. Specifically we analyze whether obstetrics partnerships promote 
matching between heterogeneous consumers (patients) and professionals, as proposed by 
Garicano and Santos. In this context, “partnerships” refer to physician group practices that share 
costs and revenues in ways that permit referrals without violating anti-kickback regulations that 
prevent payments between firms. The three specific types of matching we consider in this paper 
are: 1) whether a patient with a specific health condition is assigned to a physician who 
specializes in treating that condition; 2) whether a patient who prefers to be treated intensively is 
assigned to a physician with an intensive treatment style or skill advantage for that treatment; and 
3) whether a patient who is medically appropriate for cesarean section is assigned to a physician 
who is skilled at performing that treatment.  
One empirical challenge to identifying producer differentiation, subsequent matching and 
their welfare implications is the endogenous matching of workers with jobs (Ackerberg and 
Botticini 2003). We rely on simulations to quantify the extent of specialization, and we capitalize 
on the random pairing of physicians and patients on weekends to measure physicians’ styles (i.e. 
propensity to perform a cesarean section) and skills (as revealed by maternal health outcomes) 
without bias due to matching on unobserved patient or physician characteristics. To do this, we 
exploit the fact that because the timing of childbirth is uncertain and physicians’ weekend call 
schedules are predetermined, most women being treated by a physician in a group practice who 
go into labor on the weekend are randomly assigned to a member of the practice who is on call at 
the time. We first confirm this feature and then use it to determine whether group practices match 5 
physicians skilled at performing cesarean sections with patients clinically appropriate to receive 
the procedure, as well as whether patients with preferences for being treated by cesarean section 
match with physicians who have the appropriate treatment style or skill advantage. We also rely 
on the random pairing to identify the health benefits of matching specialization by comparing the 
health outcomes of high-risk patients randomly assigned to physicians who specialize in that 
particular health condition to the outcomes of other high-risk patients in the practice who were 
randomly assigned to non-specialists. 
We find that the proportion of high-risk patients matched with a specialist is larger 
among internally-differentiated group practices (i.e., practices where some but not all physicians 
specialize) than among solo practitioners or homogeneous groups for 11 of the 12 specific health 
conditions we examine. This additional matching is most pronounced for health conditions that 
develop during a pregnancy, when physicians’ financial disincentives to refer across firms are 
largest. Although in most cases this matching does not affect maternal health outcomes during the 
delivery or the subsequent hospital stay
1, when it does affect maternal health, the magnitudes of 
the estimated effects are large.  
We also find that physicians in group practices vary from their fellow group practice 
members in treatment style and skill levels. Although we do not find clear evidence that groups 
match patients with preferences for cesarean section with physicians who have a high propensity 
to perform them (style), our results indicate that they are treated by physicians in the group who 
are relatively more skilled at cesarean sections. Likewise, group practices direct patients for 
whom cesarean sections are more clinically appropriate to these more skilled physicians. Taken 
together, our results indicate that differentiation among physicians within an obstetrics practice 
promotes patient-physician matching in ways that improve welfare.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of obstetrics markets 
and Section III describes the data. In Section IV we examine whether group practices promote 
                                                 
1 We are not able to examine the effect of specialization on babies’ health outcomes due to data limitations. 6 
physician specialization and whether differentiated groups enhance physician-patient matching 
based on patients’ health conditions relative to patients treated by obstetricians in homogeneous 
practices. We then analyze the effects of matching and mismatching on mothers’ delivery 
outcomes in Section V. In Section VI we examine whether patients in group practices match with 
physicians based on patient treatment preferences and physicians’ treatment styles, as well as 
based on physicians’ skills and patients’ clinical characteristics. Section VII concludes.  
 
II.  Obstetrics Markets 
Obstetrics markets are characterized by heterogeneous consumers, asymmetric 
information, heterogeneous professionals often organized into partnerships, and disincentives for 
referrals between practices. These markets differ from the assumptions of the Garicano and 
Santos (2004) model in several important ways. First, “self-referral” regulations commonly 
known as the “Stark law”
2 prohibit both spot markets and retainer contracts between physicians 
who are not members of the same group practice. At the same time, payment for prenatal care 
typically is bundled with payment for the delivery, with all or almost all of the payments made to 
the physician performing the delivery.
3 One implication of this is that a physician’s expected 
profit-margins are lower at the outset of the pregnancy than they are closer to the delivery. 
Because partnerships typically share revenues, members of a group medical practice have no or 
smaller financial disincentives to avoid referrals between members of the same group. Together 
these provide strong disincentives for a physician to refer outside of but not within his own 
practice, particularly later in the pregnancy when the marginal expected profits are higher. As a 
result, groups might be especially effective at promoting matching on clinical characteristics that 
become known later in a pregnancy, such as preterm gestation, malpositioned fetus, pregnancy-
                                                 
2 The most recent regulations are officially titled, “Physicians’ referrals to health care entities with which 
they have financial relationships,” and are available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_register&position=all&page=856.  
3 For one example, see http://www.tuftshealthplan.com/providers/pdf/payment_policies/obgyn.pdf. 
Accessed April 25, 2008. 7 
related hypertension, congenital anomalies or chromosomal abnormalities.
4 In addition to these 
physician disincentives for late-term referrals across groups, high search costs and switching 
costs might discourage patients from changing practices (Wolinsky 1993), which creates an 
additional option value from selecting a partnership over a solo physician. Moreover, while 
Garicano and Santos (2004) assume consumers are uninformed, expecting mothers are likely to 
acquire information regarding their health condition and the characteristics of obstetricians 
through a number of sources, including referring primary care physicians, their own experiences, 
word-of-mouth, or externally-produced comparisons such as quality report cards (Hoerger and 
Howard 1995). Thus we would expect some matching to occur between patients and obstetricians 
in homogeneous practices (including solo physicians) based on information that is available to 
patients and their referring physicians. Although we cannot observe referrals directly, if the same 
amount of information exists ex ante in the market regarding physicians in homogeneous groups 
and those in groups with differentiated physicians, the additional matching that occurs in 
differentiated groups would be due purely to within-group referrals. 
Groups with differentiated physicians have the potential to promote matching, but 
relative to homogeneous groups they also could foster more mismatches because of how group 
practices schedule obstetricians, hospital staffing patterns, and the emergent nature of childbirth. 
Most obstetrical group practices designate a physician to perform deliveries on all patients from 
the practice that go into labor during a particular 24-hour period, although some physicians make 
themselves available to perform their patients’ deliveries during the week (but not weekend) even 
when not on call (Schauberger, Gribble and Rooney 2007).
5 Thus many patients who go into 
labor naturally (i.e., without being induced) are randomly assigned to a member of the group 
practice, particularly on weekends. 
                                                 
4 Although risk factors observed at the outset might provide evidence to physicians about the likelihood of 
developing hypertension from pregnancy, to our knowledge women have equal observable risk of having a 
malpositioned fetus. 
5 In other practices, on weekdays physicians perform deliveries for patients who begin labor between 7am 
and 5pm, but rely on physicians on “night call” to cover deliveries during the remaining hours.  8 
If a patient or the physicians in the group practice want to guarantee that a particular 
physician performs a patient’s delivery, they can either schedule a cesarean section or schedule 
labor to be induced when the preferred physician is on-call at the hospital. Induced deliveries and 
scheduled cesarean sections are much more likely to occur on a weekday than a weekend because 
hospitals are staffed more heavily during the week, and many physicians value leisure time on the 
weekend more highly. Scheduled cesarean sections and induced deliveries are common, which 
means there are many opportunities for intentional matching of patients and physicians on 
weekdays. During our 1999-2004 sample period, 17.1 percent of all deliveries in Florida and New 
York were scheduled cesarean sections, and almost all of these occurred on a weekday. 
Nationally, 20 percent of deliveries in the United States in 2000 were induced, and these were 2.3 
times more likely to occur on a weekday than a weekend (Martin et al. 2003). 
III.  Data 
We construct our sample from the Florida and New York hospital discharge data sets for 
the 1999 to 2004 time period. Our analytic data set contains information on 1.6 million deliveries 
that occurred at every non-federal, short-term acute care hospital in those states.
6 We observe the 
mother’s demographic information (age, race), her insurance coverage (e.g., HMO, Medicaid), 
codes for the principal and secondary diagnoses, procedure codes that allow us to determine 
whether the baby was delivered vaginally or via cesarean section, a unique physician identifier 
that is consistent across hospitals and years, a unique and consistent hospital identifier, and the 
quarter and year the patient was discharged. The diagnoses codes allow us to control for objective 
health conditions that affect the probability a physician will perform a cesarean section (e.g., 
whether a woman had a cesarean section prior to this delivery, whether the fetus was 
malpositioned during the delivery, and whether the labor occurred before the fetus was full-term). 
                                                 
6 There were a total of 2.38 million deliveries in Florida and New York hospitals between 1999 and 2004. 
About 740,000 of these deliveries are excluded from the analysis because the physician performed fewer 
than 100 weekend laboring deliveries, a woman received a scheduled cesarean section on a weekend, or we 
could not identify the physician who performed the delivery in the physician databases.  9 
Women are much more likely to receive a cesarean section in these situations (Gregory et al. 
2002).
7  
To minimize concerns about measuring physician specialization, treatment styles and 
skill with error, throughout the paper we restrict the analysis to physicians who performed at least 
100 deliveries between 1999 and 2004 for patients who went into labor and delivered on 
weekends. We rely on the work of others (Henry et al. 1995; Gregory et al. 2002) to determine 
whether a woman went into labor. Women who delivered vaginally or had codes indicating fetal 
distress, labor abnormalities, cord prolapse, or a breech converted to vertex presentation were 
interpreted as having labored.  
Because the physician identifiers are consistent and the data include all hospital 
discharges, we are able to examine a physician’s entire inpatient practice. Using the physician 
license numbers as a link, we obtained each physician’s telephone number(s) and office name in 
April 2005 from the Florida State Licensure Database and American Medical Information, a 
private company that tracks physicians for general marketing purposes. Where telephone numbers 
or office names were missing, we relied on internet searches conducted in September 2005 and 
January 2007 to identify them. If a physician had a unique telephone number in our sample, we 
concluded that he is a solo practitioner; physicians who shared the same telephone number were 
considered to be in the same group practice.
8 Identical practice names and physicians with 
multiple telephone numbers were used to identify two or more different locations of the same 
practice.
9  
A total of 1,655 physicians (930 in New York and 725 in Florida) performed 100 or more 
weekend laboring deliveries between 1999 and 2004. On average, each physician performed 796 
                                                 
7 Regression results below confirm this.  
8 Because physicians who performed fewer than 100 weekend deliveries between 1999 and 2004 are 
omitted from the sample, some of the physicians who qualify as being solo practitioners may in fact be in a 
group practice with other low-volume obstetricians, or with physicians who do not deliver babies (e.g., 
gynecologists.)  
9 We measure physicians’ practice affiliations with error if they changed between the start of our sample 
period (1999) and when we identified them (2005 and 2007).  10 
weekday and 187 weekend laboring deliveries over the six-year period. We identify 12 high-risk 
health conditions (e.g., twins) that substantially increase the likelihood that a pregnant woman or 
her baby will experience an adverse health outcome during delivery (Gregory et al. 2002). Table 
1 reports sample means and standard deviations for patients treated by physicians who met the 
threshold volume of weekend deliveries, separately for weekend and weekday deliveries. Overall, 
26.2 percent and 17.3 percent of women who delivered during the week or on the weekend, 
respectively, had at least one of these 12 conditions. The presence of a high-risk condition 
substantially increases the probability that a woman will receive a cesarean section, which is a 
surgical procedure, rather than delivering vaginally, and increases the probability that the mother 
or the baby will have a negative health outcome during or shortly after the delivery. For example, 
among women who delivered on a weekday, 54.6 percent of women who had a high-risk 
condition received a cesarean section, versus 21.6 percent of women without a high-risk 
condition. 
IV.  Matching on Specialization 
Obstetricians can specialize in treating particular types of patients. For example, some 
obstetricians perform a relatively large number of deliveries for women who have specific health 
risks such as hypertension (high blood pressure, or pre-eclampsia), a malpositioned fetus (e.g., a 
breech baby), or antepartum bleeding, while other obstetricians avoid such cases. A physician 
who specializes in treating a specific health condition might produce better health outcomes for 
the mother or the baby than a physician who avoids such cases, either due to innate skill 
differences between obstetricians or from learning-by-doing (e.g., technical proficiency acquired 
through experience) (Britt, Eden and Evans 2006). If this occurs, then the welfare effects of 
specialization depend on the extent to which women with a particular health condition are able to 
match with a physician who specializes in that health condition. 11 
We compare the number of each type of high-risk delivery
10 each obstetrician in Florida 
and New York actually performed between 1999 and 2004 on weekdays, when patients have 
opportunities to choose the delivering physician by scheduling a cesarean section or requesting an 
induced delivery, to the number of deliveries expected if patients were randomly assigned to an 
obstetrician in the market. An obstetrician is then categorized as a “specialist” if he performs 
significantly more high-risk deliveries than expected, an “avoider” if he performs significantly 
fewer high-risk deliveries than expected, or a “generalist” otherwise. This allows us to compare 
the extent of specialization in group practices versus solo practices. It also defines whether the 
practice consists of differentiated or homogeneous physicians. We use this to consider the effects 
of within-practice differentiation on the proportion of patients who match (i.e., high-risk patients 
assigned to specialist physicians or low-risk patients assigned to avoiders) or mismatch (i.e., high-
risk patients assigned to avoiders or low-risk patients assigned to specialists). 
In each of 1,000 iterations of a simulation, each weekday patient is randomly assigned to 
a physician in the patient’s Local Health Council District (LHCD) in Florida, or Health Service 
Area (HSA) in New York,
11 such that each physician receives his actual number of weekday 
patients for each year in the sample period. A physician is defined as a specialist in each of the 12 
high-risk conditions if the prevalence of that condition among his actual patients exceeds the 99
th 
percentile of the simulated prevalence of that condition; an “avoider” if his actual prevalence falls 
below the 1
st percentile in the simulation; and a generalist otherwise.
12  
  In Table 2 we report the proportion of physicians who are specialists and avoiders for 
each of the 12 high-risk conditions, as well as for the summary indicator of whether a woman has 
                                                 
10 A delivery is counted separately for each high-risk condition a patient has. 
11 The 11 LHCDs in Florida were formed by the state for purposes of health planning (see 
http://www.flhealthplanning.org/). The eight HSAs in New York were formed for a similar purpose. Each 
consists of one or more contiguous counties. 
12 Our results are qualitatively similar if we instead set the thresholds at the 95
th and 5
th percentile, or if we 
define the market as the hospital where the physician performs the majority of his deliveries. The 
LHCD/HSA and the hospital approaches represent extremes of the possible market, because the former 
definition is likely to be too large and the latter too small.  
 12 
any of the 12 high-risk conditions. The conditions are arranged in descending order according to 
the mean number of deliveries performed by a specialist physician over the six-year period 
(shown in the last column). The results in the first column of Table 2 indicate that specialization 
is infrequent. Based on the unweighted average across the 12 conditions, 13 percent of physicians 
are specialists and 22 percent are avoiders. There is variation across conditions, from 7 percent of 
physicians specializing in pregnancies with congenital anomalies or chromosomal abnormalities 
up to 20 percent specializing in patients with any of the 12 high-risk conditions. The percentage 
of physicians who are avoiders likewise ranges from a low of 11 percent for antepartum bleeding 
to a high of 32 percent for uterine scarring. The difference in the volume of deliveries for patients 
with each high-risk condition between a specialist and an avoider is substantial, as indicated in 
the last column. Specialists perform two to 127 times more deliveries, on average, relative to 
avoiders.  
In the second and third columns of Table 2 we report the proportions of physicians who 
are specialists and avoiders, separately for solo practitioners and members of a group practice. 
Physicians in group practices are slightly more likely than solo practitioners to specialize and are 
less likely to be avoiders, although we cannot determine whether groups purposefully recruit 
physicians different from their existing members or whether the organizational structure 
facilitates differentiation. A larger proportion of physicians in group practices specialize in 
patients who have a multiple birth, congenital anomalies, or hypertension, predominantly from 
pregnancy-related severe hypertension, relative to solo practitioners. None of these risk factors is 
observable until later in a pregnancy,
13 which is consistent with groups’ referring relatively more 
patients within the group when it is particularly costly to refer to a different practice. A smaller 
proportion of physicians in group practices are avoiders for 8 of the 13 conditions relative to solo 
                                                 
13 Of the 12 risk factors for which we have data, malpositioned fetus is the only additional one that is not 
observable until later in the pregnancy. 13 
practitioners, whereas the opposite is true for only a single condition. Thus the random 
assignment of patients to on-call physicians appears to limit the number of avoiders in groups.
14  
With these measures of physician specialization, for each risk factor we then determine 
whether group practices are homogeneous (i.e., all specialists, all generalists, or all avoiders) or 
differentiated (e.g., a specialist and two generalists). In column 6 and column 7 of Table 2 we 
report the proportion of physicians who are specialists and avoiders separately for homogenous 
groups and differentiated groups. Across all health conditions, the proportion of physicians in 
differentiated groups who are specialists (17 percent) is more than twice that of homogenous 
groups (7 percent), and the proportion of physicians in differentiated groups who are avoiders is 
almost twice as large (25 percent versus 13 percent).  
To test whether differentiated groups facilitate matching and minimize mismatching, in 
Table 3 we report the proportions of high-risk patients delivering on weekdays who are matched 
with specialists and mismatched with avoiders, separately for patients of differentiated group 
practices versus patients of solo practitioners or homogeneous groups. This indicates how many 
more high-risk patients are assigned to an appropriate physician in practices that have chosen to 
differentiate themselves and can refer between partners versus practices that by choice cannot 
refer within the practice (solo practitioners) or have chosen not to differentiate from one another 
(homogeneous group practices). On weekdays, differentiated groups achieve much greater 
matching than solo practitioners and homogeneous groups. The proportion of high-risk patients 
who are assigned to a specialist is higher among patients of differentiated group practices overall 
and for 11 of the 12 individual high-risk health conditions. On average, the share of high-risk 
patients who match with a specialist is 12 percentage points higher in differentiated group versus 
solo or homogeneous group practices. Four of the five largest differences in matching rates occur 
                                                 
14 About 25% of deliveries performed by physicians in solo practices were for mothers with at least one of 
the 12 high-risk conditions, compared with 26% for physicians in group practice, suggesting that the 
differences in specialization do not stem from solo practitioners’ positioning themselves to have healthier 
patients in general. 14 
in the conditions that develop late in a pregnancy, where members of a group practice do not face 
the financial disincentives to refer that physicians in homogeneous practices do: multiple fetuses 
(28 percentage point difference), malpositioned fetus (23 percentage point difference), 
pregnancy-related severe hypertension (17 percentage point difference), and preterm gestation 
(15 percentage point difference).  
High-risk patients in differentiated practices are slightly less likely to be assigned to 
avoiders (i.e., to mismatch) than those in homogeneous practices. Patients of differentiated group 
practices have a five percentage point lower mismatch rate than patients in homogeneous 
practices for the summary high-risk health measure, and the differentiated group mismatch rate is 
significantly lower for 5 of the individual measures of patient risk. These results are consistent 
with models of partnerships that form to lower the barriers to referrals among differentiated 
members (Garicano and Santos 2004).
15  
V.  Matching and Mothers’ Health Outcomes 
Given these differences in matching and mismatching due to within-firm specialization, 
we next analyze whether and how matching and mismatching affect mothers’ health during the 
delivery and subsequent hospital stay. Our identification of the health effect relies on random 
pairings of particular types of patients (based on whether they have a specific high-risk health 
condition) with a given type of physician (specialist, generalist, or avoider for that health 
condition) to eliminate differences in unobservable patient characteristics between physicians in a 
group due to referrals or other sources of patient-practice matching. As a result, we restrict the 
sample to group practice patients who delivered on the weekend, because typically these patients 
are randomly assigned to a physician within the group.  
                                                 
15 We also compared the matching rates separately for patients who are uninsured or have Medicaid 
insurance versus patients with private health insurance, and found them to be similar. This suggests that 
maternal income and education do not appear to be important for creating matches, and that the benefits of 
within-group referrals do not vary by socioeconomic status. These results are available from the authors by 
request. 15 
A small number of weekend deliveries are scheduled for a cesarean section or 
inducement, where scheduling can permit the patient and the physician to match intentionally.
16 
Thus we further restrict the weekend sample to deliveries where a woman goes into labor, thereby 
excluding scheduled weekend cesarean sections and reducing the amount of non-random pairing 
in this sample. Because we cannot observe from the discharge data whether a delivery was 
induced, a small part of the weekend laboring sample might contain non-randomly-paired patients 
and physicians. To ameliorate the potential for bias, we further restrict the sample to groups that 
simulations indicate assign their weekend laboring patients randomly. The analysis considers only 
within-group differences, because call schedules assign patients to physicians randomly only 
within a group practice, and patient sorting into groups is likely to occur on the basis of 
unobserved characteristics that affect outcomes. As a result, only internally-differentiated groups 
can be used to identify the health benefits of matching.  
Whether a group is internally-differentiated and randomly assigns its patients is 
determined separately for each health condition we examine. To identify and exclude any groups 
that do not randomly pair weekend patients with physicians, we perform 1,000 iterations of a 
simulation that randomly assigns a group’s weekend, laboring patients to the physicians in that 
group, where the yearly number of simulated patients assigned to each physician equals his actual 
volume of weekend laboring cases. After each iteration we record the mean patient characteristics 
for each physician (e.g., the proportion of his patients who have antepartum bleeding, severe 
pregnancy-induced hypertension, or a malpositioned fetus). Group practices with at least one 
physician whose actual mean for a particular health condition is below the 5
th percentile or above 
the 95
th percentile of the physician-specific distribution of the simulated mean of that health 
condition are considered to violate the assumption that weekend patients are randomly assigned 
for that health condition, and are excluded from the outcomes analysis. We perform this test for 
                                                 
16 Previous studies indicate that most induced deliveries nationally occur on weekdays, when hospitals are 
staffed more heavily (Martin et al. 2003). 16 
ten of the 12 high-risk health conditions separately as well as for an indicator of whether a patient 
has any of the 12 conditions. We omit the two health conditions where specialists are most 
infrequent and have very low patient volumes: uterine scarring (a mean of 7.5 deliveries over a 
six-year period for specialists) and congenital anomalies or chromosomal abnormalities (a mean 
of 6 deliveries over a six-year period for specialists).  
To measure mothers’ outcomes, we use a coding system established by HealthGrades 
(2007) to determine whether or not a woman experienced an adverse outcome during the delivery 
or subsequent hospitalization. This system identifies 66 discrete diagnosis codes for adverse 
outcomes for a cesarean section and 64 discrete diagnosis codes for adverse outcomes for a 
vaginal delivery. Examples include injury to pelvic organs, rupture of the uterus, 4
th degree 
perineal laceration, anemia due to acute loss of blood, or major puerperal infection. In our 
sample, adverse outcomes for the mother during or shortly after delivery occurred for 10.3 
percent of deliveries where a woman went into labor and delivered on the weekend. To create a 
single summary measure of mothers’ outcomes that allows the utility loss to vary across the 
different adverse events, we conduct regressions of the form 
(1)  1 1 0 ε φ φ + + + = i i i F R O   
where Oi is the number of days that a woman spends in the hospital following a delivery, Ri is a 
vector of indicator variables for whether the woman experienced each of the adverse events 
specified by Health Grades, and Fi represents hospital fixed effects. This approach assumes that 
the utility loss from an adverse event is proportional to the marginal effect of that event on the 
length of a mother’s hospital stay, controlling for the hospital of admission. 
We estimate these regressions separately by state and delivery mode (i.e., vaginal and 
cesarean section) using data from 1998, the year prior to the beginning of our sample. Results are 
reported in Appendix A. In the cesarean section regressions, the coefficients are greater than 0.50 
and significantly different from zero for 20 of the adverse outcomes in Florida and 19 in New 17 
York, whereas in both Florida and New York 11 events in the vaginal delivery regressions have a 
positive coefficient of that magnitude. That is, these events are associated with a woman spending 
at least an extra half day in the hospital following the delivery. To generate a single, continuous 
measure of each woman’s health outcome, we multiply the vector of adverse outcome 
coefficients from the 1998 regressions by the vector of indicator variables for whether the woman 
in the 1999-2004 sample actually experienced each adverse event, so that larger values indicating 
a worse outcome.
17 
With measures of patient types, physician types, and mothers’ outcomes, we analyze the 
impact of matching on mothers’ health with regressions of the form  
(2)  i O ˆ  = σ0 + σ1Hi + σ2Sj + σ3Aj + σ4Hi*Sj + σ5Hi*Aj + σ 6Xi + σ7Y + σ8G + ε2 
where  i O ˆ  is the predicted incremental length of stay due to adverse events experienced by a 
patient estimated in equation (1), Hi is an indicator of whether a patient has high-risk condition i; 
Sj and Aj are indicators for specialist and avoider physicians, respectively (with generalist 
physicians as the reference category); Xi is a vector of characteristics of the patient and her 
delivering physician; and G is a vector of group practice fixed effects. The vector Xi includes an 
indicator of whether the physician is female, years of physician experience and its quadratic, an 
indicator if experience is missing, an indicator for New York patients, calendar year indicators, a 
patient’s age and its quadratic, an indicator if age is missing, an indicator is a patient is a minority 
(black or Hispanic) and an indicator if race/ethnicity is missing, indicators for whether a patient is 
uninsured or covered by Medicaid, an indicator for whether the patient has had a previous 
cesarean section, and indicators for each of the other 11 high-risk conditions. It is worth repeating 
that we classify physicians as specialists, generalists or avoiders on their weekday deliveries, 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, we also create a dichotomous outcome variable measuring whether a woman 
experienced any of the major adverse outcomes, where major is defined as an outcome with an incremental 
effect on length of stay () 1 φ of 0.5 or greater. The overall pattern of results with this dependent variable 
was similar. 18 
when intentional matching occurs, whereas we examine the impact of matching due to within-
group differentiation on outcomes based on weekend deliveries, where our simulation has 
validated the assumption that the call schedule randomly assigns high- and low-risk patients to 
physicians within the practice.  
  We rely on linear models to test the effects of matching on mothers’ outcomes. Because 
the dependent variable is generated from the predicted coefficients from equation (1), we correct 
for heteroskedasticity by weighting each observation in equation (2) by the inverse of the 
standard error of the prediction of  i O ˆ  (Mayda 2006).
18 Robust standard errors are calculated, 
however no clustering is done: despite the hierarchical nature of the data, the intra-group 
correlation coefficients of the regression residuals are all zero, indicating that clustering is 
unnecessary and inefficient, particularly with the large number of patients per group.
19  
If the following hold: (1) assigning a patient who has a particular (observed) health 
condition to a physician within the practice who specializes in that condition (i.e., matching) 
improves the patient’s delivery outcome, (2) assigning such a patient to an avoider (i.e., 
mismatching) worsens her outcome, (3) assigning a patient who does not have a particular health 
condition to a physician within the practice who avoids that condition (i.e., matching) improves 
the patient’s delivery outcome, and (4) assigning such a patient to a specialist (i.e., mismatching) 
worsens her outcome, then we would expect the following results: 
-  σ2 > 0: low-risk patient outcomes are worse when randomly assigned to a specialist 
physician (i.e., a mismatch) rather than a generalist physician (the omitted category) 
-  σ3 < 0: low-risk patient outcomes are better when randomly assigned to an avoider (i.e., a 
match) rather than a generalist 
-  σ3 - σ2 < 0: low-risk patient outcomes are better when randomly assigned to an avoider 
rather than a specialist 
-  σ4 < 0: high-risk patient outcomes are better when randomly assigned to a specialist (i.e., 
a match) rather than a generalist 
-  σ5 > 0: high-risk patient outcomes are worse when randomly assigned to an avoider (i.e., 
a mismatch) rather than a generalist 
                                                 
18 The pattern of results from these weighted least squares estimates was not different from the pattern of 
estimates using robust standard errors alone to account for heteroskedasticity.  
19 Hansen (2007) provides additional details. 19 
-  σ4 - σ5 < 0: high-risk patient outcomes are better when randomly assigned to a specialist 
rather than an avoider. 
 
In Table 4 we report estimated coefficients and robust standard errors separately for a 
woman’s delivery outcome if she has one of 10 specific health conditions, as well as whether she 
has any high-risk condition. Overall, the results provide some evidence that matching improves 
mothers’ outcomes and mismatching harms them. Of the 66 tests of the hypotheses listed above 
(i.e., six tests in 11 regressions), the hypotheses are accepted at the five-percent level in seven 
instances (10.6 percent), while providing statistically significant counterfactual evidence in only 
one (1.5 percent) instance, indicating that the counterfactual findings are likely due to chance 
while the supporting results are not  
The benefits of matching occur primarily from assigning low-risk patients to avoider 
physicians as opposed to generalist or specialist physicians. Specifically, matching low-risk 
patients with avoider physicians (σ3 < 0, or σ3 – σ2 < 0) significantly (at the five-percent level) 
improves outcomes for women who do not have any high-risk condition, any hypertension, a 
malpositioned fetus, or antepartum bleeding. Surprisingly, there is only one instance (for an 
unengaged fetal head) of a statistically significant (at the five-percent level) benefit from 
matching high-risk patients with specialists rather than generalists (σ4 < 0), and even here the 
difference between a specialist and avoider is insignificant. Contrary to the hypotheses above, in 
one case there is a statistically significant benefit associated with mismatching: assigning a 
woman with any hypertension to a physician who avoids that condition rather than a specialist is 
associated with improved outcomes, although being assigned to an avoider is not statistically 
different from a generalist. Finally, there is only one case where mismatching has negative health 
consequences for the mother: assigning a woman who does not have antepartum bleeding to a 
specialist rather than a generalist (α2 > 0) is associated with worse outcomes.
20  
                                                 
20 Mismatching a pregnancy without unengaged fetal head to a specialist also has worse outcomes at the 
ten-percent level. 20 
When they exist, the positive benefits of matching and the negative consequences of 
mismatching are large. Based on the mean of the dependent variable for women who do not have 
the specific health condition, there are large predicted improvements in a mother’s delivery 
outcome if she is matched with an avoider physician rather than a specialist for any hypertension 
(22 percent fewer predicted days in the hospital due to complications), malpositioned fetus (23 
percent), or antepartum bleeding (52 percent). Similarly, mothers without any of the 12 risk 
factors experience 19 percent fewer predicted hospital days due to complications when paired 
with an avoider physician who treats few patients with any high-risk factors rather than a 
generalist. In the one instance of negative consequences of mismatching, a woman who does not 
have antepartum bleeding is predicted to spend 41 percent more days in the hospital due to 
complications if assigned to a physician who specializes in that risk factor relative to being 
assigned to a generalist. 
Our approach measures the effect of within-group specialization on the outcomes of 
women who go into labor and deliver on the weekend. The results are likely to underestimate the 
overall benefits of specialization and matching and underestimate the costs associated with 
mismatching for several reasons. First, groups might respond to the potential risks of mismatches 
for certain patients and assign them to specific physicians by inducing or scheduling their 
deliveries during the week, as supported by the observed differences in the health conditions of 
weekday and weekend patients (Table 1). If groups do this for the patients who benefit the most 
from matching, then the weekend estimates, which rely on random assignment for the remaining 
patients, should be lower-bound estimates of the benefits of non-random matching on health 
characteristics. That is, we estimate the benefits of specialization and matching on a relatively 
healthy group of patients who may benefit less from matching than the average patient. This also 
holds true if matching occurs across groups for conditions that are known at the outset of the 
woman’s pregnancy. Second, we consider matching only along a single dimension (either a single 
risk factor, or an indicator for the presence of any risk factor) at a time, but the health outcomes 21 
might depend on successful matching across multiple dimensions simultaneously.
21 Third, we 
observe matching only for the delivery itself, whereas matching for prenatal care might also be 
important.
22 Fourth, because of data limitations, we do not observe the delivery and subsequent 
health outcome of the baby, who may be the primary beneficiary of specialization and matching.  
The benefits of matching in Table 4 occur primarily from matching low-risk patients (i.e., 
patients who do not have a specific health condition) with avoider physicians. This raises the 
question of whether group practices are better able to facilitate such matches relative to solo 
practitioners for weekday deliveries, when the greatest opportunity for within-group referrals 
exists. To address this question we replicated Table 3 for low-risk instead of high-risk patients. 
As shown in Table 5, low-risk patients in differentiated group practices are generally more likely 
to be matched with an avoider physician than in solo or homogeneous group practices. 
Differentiated groups have higher matching for 10 of the 12 risk factors individually, although 
homogenous practices have a higher matching rate for the summary measure. Differentiated 
groups are significantly more likely to match low-risk patients with avoider physicians for 
antepartum bleeding (20% vs. 9%, p<0.001) and a malpositioned fetus (23% vs. 19%, p<0.001), 
the conditions with the largest benefits of matching. For the other two risk factors where 
matching significantly affected mothers’ health (any hypertension and unengaged fetal head), 
however, homogeneous practices achieved greater matching. Similarly, low-risk patients in 
differentiated groups are much more likely to be mismatched with a specialist for most conditions 
                                                 
21 However, patient risk factors do not correlate highly.  Only two pairs had correlations of at least 0.10 
(multiples and malpositioned fetus, ρ=0.10, and multiples and preterm gestation, ρ=0.13). 
22 In order to address this issue, we created an indicator variable if there is a specialist (and separately for 
an avoider) for a particular health condition in the patient’s practice, regardless of whether that specialist 
actually delivered the baby on the weekend. These variables were interacted with the vector of dummies for 
the patient’s health condition. Results from these models for the effects of matching for the delivery were 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4, and they indicated little additional effect due to the 
potential to match for prenatal care. 22 
including for antepartum bleeding (14% vs. 8%, p<0.001), where these mismatches resulted in 
worse outcomes for mothers.
23  
V.  Matching on Style and Skill 
A.   Within-group matching by physician cesarean section style and unobserved patient 
preferences 
There might be benefits of specialization beyond those based on a patient’s observed 
health condition and a physician’s experience treating that condition. In this section we examine 
whether group practices facilitate two other types of matching: directing patients who prefer to be 
treated aggressively to physicians who have such treatment styles; and directing patients with 
those preferences or high-risk patients to physicians who are skilled in a particular delivery 
method (cesarean sections).  
Previous research suggests that obstetricians differ substantially in their treatment style, 
defined as their propensity to perform a cesarean section conditional on a patient’s pre-delivery 
health condition, although these measures might be biased due to patient-physician matching on 
unobserved characteristics (Grant 2005; Epstein and Nicholson 2005). If patients have 
homogeneous preferences for this dimension of a physician’s treatment style and there is a single 
style that produces the best expected outcome for all types of patients, then this variation reduces 
welfare. Although we are not aware of any research that has examined preferences for cesarean 
sections specifically, mothers have strong, heterogeneous preferences for related factors in 
obstetrics, such as the site of delivery (e.g., Donaldson, Hundley, and Mapp 1998; Miller 2006). 
This suggests that some of the observed differentiation in physicians’ treatment styles might arise 
when women with different preferences match with physicians who have particular styles. Such 
differentiation would improve welfare (Wolinsky 1993).  
                                                 
23 Differentiated groups were actually less likely to mismatch pregnancies with unengaged fetal head (15% 
vs. 17%, p<0.001), which also had marginally significant negative health effects from such mismatching. 23 
We use the same data set to examine whether group practices with differentiated 
physicians promote the matching of patients based on obstetricians’ style and skill. Our measure 
of an obstetrician’s style is his risk-adjusted cesarean section rate for patients randomly paired 
with him: that is, the probability that a patient who labors on the weekend would receive a 
cesarean section if treated by the physician, controlling for the mother’s observed characteristics. 
A cesarean section is a surgical procedure and, all else equal, is more expensive than a vaginal 
delivery, requires a longer recovery period, and presents increased health risks for the mother. In 
certain clinical situations, however, a cesarean section improves the expected health of the mother 
and infant.  
The cesarean section rates in Florida and New York have increased sharply since the 
mid-1990s. As of 2004, cesarean sections accounted for 34.4 percent of all deliveries in Florida, 
as displayed in Figure 1. Cesarean sections either can be scheduled in advance of labor or can 
occur after a woman goes into labor. The recent increase in the Florida cesarean section rate has 
been driven primarily by a doubling of the scheduled cesarean section rate, from 10.9 percent in 
1996 to 24.8 percent of all deliveries in 2004. Scheduled cesarean sections now account for about 
two-thirds of all cesarean sections in Florida. Figure 1 also shows the percentage of total 
deliveries that are scheduled cesarean sections separately for women with and without a high-risk 
condition.
24 The latter, sometimes referred to as “patient-choice” cesarean sections, now 
constitute slightly more than one-half of all scheduled cesarean sections in Florida. Figure 2 
shows comparable data on deliveries at in New York hospitals. Although cesarean sections are 
used less frequently in New York than in Florida, the basic patterns in cesarean section rates over 
time are similar between the two states. 
To generate each physician’s treatment style (cesarean section propensity), we perform 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions for all patients, separately for Florida and New 
                                                 
24 We consider a woman to be high-risk if she has one or more of the 12 health conditions listed in Table 1. 24 
York and separately for weekend deliveries for mothers who went into labor and weekday 
deliveries (Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra 2006):  
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Cis is an indicator variable for whether a patient i in state s received a cesarean section; J 
is a full vector of physician fixed effects; X is a vector of patient characteristics that affect the 
likelihood of receiving a cesarean section (age, race, indicators for whether age or race were 
missing, type of health insurance, and health conditions); Y is a vector of fixed effects for year of 
delivery; and the superscript d refers to weekday deliveries. The coefficient estimates of the 
patient characteristics from equations (3) and (4) are reported in Appendix B. From these 
estimates we generate a predicted propensity to receive a cesarean section for each patient, 
conditional on the patient’s characteristics and holding fixed the physician’s treatment style: 









is Y X J C β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ * + + =  for weekday patients, where J* represents a physician selected 
arbitrarily from J. The overall median predicted cesarean section propensity was 0.140. 
Among group practices that assign their weekend patients randomly, Equation 3 allows 
us to measure group members’ treatment styles as if they were to treat an identical patient 
population. Specifically, the coefficients on the physician indicators,  j β ˆ , in the weekend 
regressions measure the average adjusted probability that physician j performed a cesarean 
section on a patient randomly-assigned within the group practice, controlling for observed patient 
characteristics. Thus differences in  j β ˆ  within a given medical group should be due to differences 
in style, i.e., physicians’ perceptions about how to treat a common set of patients who labor, 
rather than due to within-practice physician-patient matching based on unobservable 
characteristics. Therefore, only the 407 physicians in group practices that assign their weekend 25 
patients randomly based on patients’ predicted cesarean section propensity are included in the 
following analyses, where we use the simulation method described in Section III to identify 
practices that randomize.
25 
Because the randomness of the call schedule can eliminate unobserved differences in 
patient characteristics only across physicians in a given group, we repeat the estimates of 
equations (3) and (4) but replace the physician fixed effects with group practice fixed effects. 
With these results, we then generate the group-demeaned measures of each physician’s c-section 
style, ( ) g j β β ˆ ˆ − , where the subscript g refers to a group practice. We find a degree of within-
group variation across physicians’ c-section style, spanning -0.024 (i.e., 2.4 percentage points) at 
the 10
th percentile to 0.021 at the 90
th percentile, with a mean of -0.001 and a standard deviation 
of 0.019. 
With measures of physicians’ treatment styles, we consider whether patients match with 
physicians whose styles are consistent with their preferences. For example, a patient who places a 
high cost on the adverse outcomes associated with a cesarean section could reduce the probability 
she will have a cesarean section by scheduling her labor to be induced by a conservative 
obstetrician with a low cesarean section style, or she may request that a particular physician 
perform the delivery if she goes into labor during the week. Conversely, a woman in good health 
who wants to avoid laboring altogether might be matched to a physician in the practice willing to 
perform a patient-choice cesarean section.
26 
If patients with particular preferences match within groups with physicians who have 
commensurate treatment styles, patients who want intensive treatment would match with 
physicians who have a large/positive  j β ˆ  relative to their colleagues within the group practice 
                                                 
25 One limitation of investigating within-firm heterogeneity and matching in this context is that many of the 
firms are small: 45% of these physicians are in groups of 2, and the mean number of physicians in the 
group is 3.2.  
26 An obstetrician quoted in a 2003 New York Times article confirms that these types of decisions occur: 
“Obstetrics has become very consumer-driven. When a woman can’t get what she wants from one doctor, 
she’ll go to another” (Brody 2003). 26 
( ) g j β β ˆ ˆ − , and patients who want less intensive treatment would match with physicians who 
have a small/negative  j β ˆ . As a result, a physician who performs many patient-choice scheduled 




j β β ˆ ˆ −  because his actual 
proportion of cesarean sections will exceed the predicted proportion based on his patients’ 
observed characteristics, and vice versa for physicians who are attracting patients who want to be 
treated conservatively.  
As a result, if group practices promote matching based on patient preferences and 
physician styles, there would be more variation across physicians in a group in their weekday 
cesarean section rates when there are ample opportunities for patients and physicians to 
intentionally match than in their weekend rates: σ
d






should be true even when cesarean section rates are adjusted for observed patient characteristics, 
because patients with unobserved preferences will be matching with specific physicians. 
Physician treatment styles on the weekend are measured less precisely than weekday styles 
because the weekend sample size is substantially smaller. Therefore, we report the results of the 
variance test both without and with a Bayesian shrinkage adjustment. The Bayesian shrinkage 
adjustment will move a physician’s treatment style toward the sample mean if it has a low signal-
to-noise ratio (Hofer et al. 1999), which may result in less variation between physicians on the 
weekend (due to a relatively small sample size) relative to the weekday. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject normality of the distributions of these group-level 
ratios of the weekday and weekend variances in physician cesarean section style. Consequently, 
we report results from the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in Panel A of Table 6. 
These reject the hypothesis that σ
d
g > σg. We confirm this by testing whether the median group’s 
ratio of the weekend to weekday intra-group variances is equal to one, where we bootstrap the 
                                                 
27 We would also expect σ
d
g to exceed σg if patients with unobserved health characteristics that increase the 
expected marginal benefit of cesarean sections to match with physicians who have a high propensity to 
perform cesarean sections to improve their expected health outcome. 27 
standard errors with 1,000 iterations. Results are similar when we consider only groups of three 
or more physicians. These results are not consistent with sorting based on unobserved patient 
preferences for physician treatment styles.  
One shortcoming of testing whether the weekday and weekend variances are equal is that 
the variables are affected by both physician and patient decisions. For example, physicians with 
high cesarean section styles might convince some of their patients that do not have strong 
preferences for cesarean sections to schedule cesarean sections during the week. If this 
phenomenon accounts for the similar variance between weekday and weekend treatment styles, 
the welfare benefits are more ambiguous than they would be if the differences are driven by well-
informed patients.
28 









g) is the difference between the number of weekday scheduled patient-choice 
cesarean sections physician j performs and the average of his group practice. Finding that 
physicians who perform more cesarean sections relative to their colleagues on randomly-assigned 
laboring weekend patients also perform a large number of scheduled weekday patient-choice 
cesarean sections would suggest that patient preferences are driving the matches. Scheduled high-
risk cesarean sections, on the other hand, could be initiated by either a patient or a physician. 




j g j Q Q − − , ˆ ˆ β β  for all cesarean 
sections and each type of cesarean section separately. The correlations are significantly different 
from zero for all cesarean sections and for both high-risk and patient-choice cesarean sections. 
The latter are presumably initiated by the patient. Low-risk patients who nevertheless want an 
                                                 
28 The ambiguity results from the fact that physicians with higher cesarean section propensities might also 
have greater skill for cesarean sections than vaginal deliveries, thus leading to better outcomes (Chandra 
and Staiger 2007), but this could be offset by the mothers’ preferences for a vaginal delivery. However, the 
correlation of physicians’ cesarean section style and skill measures, relative to their peers’, is 0.05 
(p=0.32), where the positive coefficient indicates that those with worse cesarean section outcomes tend to 
perform more cesarean sections on their randomly-paired weekend laboring patients. This low correlation 
allows us to separately test matching based on style and skill, which we investigate in the analysis that 
follows.  28 
elective cesarean section appear to match with a physician in the practice who has a style inclined 
toward cesarean sections. This supports the interpretation that patient preferences create some of 
the observed variation in obstetricians’ treatment styles. Physicians in the sample performed an 
average of 13.6 weekday patient-choice cesarean sections per year. A physician who is at the 90
th 
percentile of the difference between his own weekend cesarean section rate and that of his group 
is predicted to perform 8.8 more weekday patient choice cesarean sections per year than his 
colleague who is at the 10
th percentile of the distribution.
29 This represents a fairly large (65 
percent) increase in a physician’s annual quantity of patient-choice cesarean sections. The 
apparent discrepancy between Panels A and B of Table 6 in whether unobserved patient 
preferences contribute to weekday matching is due to the fact that physicians with styles geared 
toward cesarean sections also perform a higher total volume of weekday deliveries relative to 
their peers (ρ=0.12, p=0.019). The result is that these physicians’ weekday cesarean section 
volumes are higher but their weekday styles are not farther from their group’s average , because 
the definition of style depends on the total volume as well. 
 
B.   Within-group matching by physician cesarean section skill  
We also test whether group practices match physicians and patients based on skill and 
patients’ clinical characteristics and/or their unobserved preferences. Specifically, we first 
examine whether a groups’ patients are matched with physicians during the week based on a 
physician’s absolute or comparative advantage in performing cesarean section deliveries, relative 
to his peers in his group, and the appropriateness of a c-section for the patient, predicted from 
equation (4) above. To examine this, we estimate:  
(5)  m jm i m m i J X O 5 1 0 ˆ ε ξ ξ ξ + + + =  , 
                                                 




g) on (βj – βg) and used the estimated coefficients to generate 




g) at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of (βj – βg).  At the 10
th percentile of (βj – βg) 




g) was -4.45, and at the 90
th percentile of (βj – βg) (0.024), the 




g) was 4.31. 29 
separately by mode of delivery m for laboring weekend patients of groups that randomly assign 
their weekend patients to physicians.  i O ˆ  is a woman’s delivery outcome generated from equation 
(1) above; X is a vector of patient characteristics; J is a full set of physician indicator variables; ξjc 
is the physician’s skill at performing cesarean sections; and ξjv is his skill at performing vaginal 
deliveries. Lower values of  i O ˆ  indicate better outcomes. A physician will have a negative ξjc if 
his patients who deliver by cesarean section have fewer or less severe complications than 
expected given the patients’ observed pre-delivery health. Because we rely on the random within-
group pairing of physicians with patients who labor on the weekend, as before we restrict the 
analysis to those groups that randomly assign patients based on clinical factors. Because this 
identification strategy eliminates unobserved differences across physicians in the same group 
only, we continue to examine group-demeaned measures of skill by repeating equation (5) to 
generate ( ) gc jc ξ ξ − . 
  Physicians vary substantially in their skill at performing cesarean sections. For example, 
weekend patients randomly assigned to physicians at the 10
th percentile of the distribution of the 
absolute advantage measure of skill average 0.20 more hospital days due to complications than 
the group’s average than those treated by physicians at the 90
th percentile, and the standard 
deviation of this distribution is 0.10.  
  To consider matching based on absolute advantage and the appropriateness of a cesarean 




js gc jc C C ˆ ˆ , − −ξ ξ  is less than zero. 
Results in Table 7 Panel A indicate that physicians with better weekend outcomes treat patients 
for whom cesarean deliveries are more appropriate during the week, supporting the hypothesis 
that weekday patients match with physicians based on skill and observed clinical characteristics. 
This is consistent with group practices internally referring the most difficult cesarean section 
cases to physicians who are skilled at performing cesarean sections. We also consider matching 30 









js β β −  is the physician’s group-demeaned, 
risk-adjusted weekday cesarean section rate, which reflects differences in patients’ preferences.  
Results in Table 7 suggest that this type of matching occurs.  
Alternative interpretations exist for both of these measures of matching based on skill. 
Both correlations would also be negative if skill is acquired by learning through performing more 
cases. Likewise the second correlation could be negative if physicians more highly skilled at 
cesarean sections are more likely to perform them, holding observed and unobserved patient 





gc), which indicates that physicians who perform more weekday patient-choice cesarean 
sections did not have better weekend outcomes (ρ=-0.056, P=0.256). Likewise, the negative and 
insignificant relationship between physicians’ cesarean section skill and style reported above does 
not support the alternative explanation that physician treatment decisions rather than unobserved 
patient preferences account for the higher propensity for physicians more highly skilled at 
cesarean sections to also have higher weekday risk-adjusted cesarean section rates.  
  Because absolute advantage in cesarean section skill ignores opportunity costs, we repeat 
this analysis using physicians’ comparative advantage for cesarean sections over vaginal 


















. Results in Panel B of Table 7 are similar 
to those in Panel A but smaller in size and significance. This greater importance of absolute 
advantage is consistent with existing theory, which predicts that absolute advantage will be a 
better proxy for optimal assignment than comparative advantage (MacDonald and Markusen 
1985, Sattinger 1993.) Together these results suggest that groups match patients to physicians 
based on their skill in welfare-increasing ways.  31 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper we observed a professional services market in which firms play an important 
role in coordinating differentiated high-skilled workers due to barriers in markets that derive from 
imperfect or asymmetric information, incentives, and regulation. We found that the greatest 
amount of additional matching due to firm coordination occurred in situations where regulations 
and payment methods created the highest financial barriers to across-firm referrals. Specifically, 
obstetrics partnerships appear to facilitate greater matching by promoting within-group referrals 
and pairing specialized physicians with high-risk patients, particularly for health conditions that 
become known only later in the pregnancy. In addition to matching based on patient and 
physician clinical characteristics, we found some evidence of matching within groups along other 
dimensions. Internally-differentiated partnerships appropriately matched patients with observed 
clinical characteristics and unobserved preferences to physicians based on physicians’ absolute 
skill advantage. However, the extent to which partnerships promoted matching based on 
unobserved patient preferences and physician style was ambiguous.
30 Despite the institutional 
peculiarities of obstetrics markets, these results are consistent with a number of related theoretical 
and empirical studies in other settings. Additional work could consider whether matching in this 
context is also influenced by organizational characteristics other than the degree of specialization, 
or the presence of a managerial hierarchy (Garicano and Hubbard, 2007). 
Partnerships of heterogeneous obstetricians and subsequent patient-physician matching 
enhances welfare via both improved maternal health outcomes and greater incorporation of 
patient preferences. Yet it remains unclear whether the overall level of differentiation across 
physicians in obstetrics markets is optimal. Such issues are important to consider as various 
technologies are developed to standardize physician treatment decisions. Similarly, from the 
perspective of the industrial organization of and labor force planning for obstetrics, it remains 
                                                 
30 The identification strategy precluded a direct comparison between the degree of matching in groups with 
differentiated physicians with the degree in homogeneous groups and solo practices. 32 
unclear whether greater matching and welfare would result from more within-firm heterogeneity, 
more consolidation of physicians into larger partnerships, or expanded scope of existing 
partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988).  
One reason for this ambiguity is due to the random pairing of patients and physicians 
within obstetrics partnerships. While econometrically convenient to generate unbiased measures 
of physicians’ styles and skills, it also incorporates a tradeoff into partnerships’ decisions about 
the degree of internal differentiation. Referring patients between physicians allows a group 
practice to match patients with appropriate physicians during the week, but this also creates 
mismatches from patients and physicians being paired randomly due to call schedules on week 
nights and weekends. We found that differentiated groups were less likely than solo practices to 
have “avoider” physicians who treat fewer high-risk patients than expected, and more likely to 
match low-risk patients with specialists. This random pairing of patients and physicians for 
deliveries also might results in less heterogeneity than in other high-skilled labor markets. 
Alternatively, the non-emergent nature of pregnancy, as opposed to the delivery itself, likely 
contributes to more matching relative to other high-skilled labor markets, particularly in 
medicine.33 
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Any of the 12 high-risk conditions 0.173 0.378 0.262 0.440
Preterm gestation 0.065 0.246 0.070 0.256
Any hypertension 0.041 0.198 0.068 0.252
Malpositioned fetus 0.028 0.165 0.068 0.251
Macrosomia 0.015 0.120 0.029 0.167
Maternal soft tissue disorder 0.015 0.120 0.028 0.165
Pregnancy-related severe hypertension 0.004 0.066 0.012 0.107
Antepartum bleeding 0.009 0.092 0.017 0.128
Multiples (twins) 0.006 0.075 0.013 0.112
Herpes 0.010 0.097 0.014 0.117
Unengaged fetal head 0.011 0.105 0.014 0.119
Uterine scarring 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.046
Congenital anomaly or chromosomal abnormality 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.032
N Deliveries
Patient Demographics
Age 27.1 6.2 27.8 6.3
Black or Hispanic 0.512 0.500 0.475 0.499
Medicaid or other public health insurance 0.513 0.500 0.471 0.499
Florida 0.480 0.500 0.534 0.499
Delivery Characteristics
Mother went into labor 1.000 0.000 0.789 0.408
Delivery performed by c-section: 0.099 0.299 0.302 0.459
 - Scheduled, high-risk 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.305
 - Scheduled, patient-choice 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.309
 - Unscheduled (following labor) 0.099 0.299 0.091 0.288
Health outcome (continuous measure)* 0.030 0.169 0.039 0.216
Predicted C-section probability** 0.077 0.120 0.335 0.295
* Generated from regressions reported in Appendix A
** Generated from regressions reported in Appendix B
312,695 1,327,461
Weekend Laboring 
















Any of the 12 high-risk conditions N=347 N=598
Specialists 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.621 0.16 0.23 371.2
Avoiders 0.28 0.33 0.24 -0.09 0.000 0.23 0.25 207.7
Preterm gestation N=391 N=554
Specialists 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.109 0.11 0.21 149.1
Avoiders 0.28 0.32 0.26 -0.06 0.010 0.20 0.30 44.8
Any hypertension N=305 N=640
Specialists 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.010 0.12 0.25 134.0
Avoiders 0.25 0.28 0.23 -0.06 0.009 0.19 0.25 47.5
Malpositioned fetus N=439 N=506
Specialists 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.771 0.05 0.20 120.9
Avoiders 0.16 0.19 0.14 -0.05 0.006 0.07 0.19 48.6
Macrosomia N=366 N=579
Specialists 0.17 0.18 0.16 -0.02 0.282 0.10 0.19 60.7
Avoiders 0.25 0.30 0.21 -0.09 0.000 0.22 0.20 13.3
Maternal soft tissue disorder N=294 N=651
Specialists 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.491 0.14 0.19 55.8
Avoiders 0.25 0.27 0.23 -0.04 0.087 0.18 0.26 12.8
Pregnancy-related severe hypertension N=443 N=502
Specialists 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.052 0.05 0.16 37.1
Avoiders 0.19 0.23 0.16 -0.07 0.000 0.07 0.23 4.0
Antepartum bleeding N=483 N=462
Specialists 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.687 0.03 0.14 37.1
Avoiders 0.11 0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.096 0.00 0.19 7.1
Multiples (twins) N=445 N=500
Specialists 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.000 0.05 0.18 35.4
Avoiders 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.850 0.04 0.23 4.5
Herpes N=371 N=574
Specialists 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.098 0.06 0.19 35.1
Avoiders 0.18 0.21 0.17 -0.05 0.017 0.09 0.21 5.1
Unengaged fetal head N=347 N=598
Specialists 0.17 0.20 0.14 -0.05 0.004 0.11 0.17 34.0
Avoiders 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.05 0.022 0.17 0.33 4.0
Uterine scarring N=239 N=706
Specialists 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.732 0.04 0.08 7.5
Avoiders 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.01 0.521 0.23 0.36 0.1
Congenital anomaly or chromosomal abnormality N=430 N=515
Specialists 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.021 0.03 0.11 6.1
Avoiders 0.23 0.24 0.22 -0.03 0.223 0.14 0.29 0.1
Unweighted average
Specialists 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.17
Avoiders 0.22 0.24 0.20 -0.03 0.13 0.25
Notes: Solo includes physicians who practiced alone and physicians in group practices with other physicians who failed












Group - (Solo & 
Homogeneous 
Group) P-value
Any of 12 risk factors
Matched with Specialist 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.04 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.24 0.26 0.21 -0.05 0.000
Preterm gestation
Matched with Specialist 0.34 0.28 0.44 0.15 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.18 0.19 0.18 -0.01 0.002
Any hypertension
Matched with Specialist 0.35 0.30 0.44 0.14 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.17 0.18 0.16 -0.02 0.000
Malpositioned fetus
Matched with Specialist 0.26 0.18 0.41 0.23 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.450
Macrosomia
Matched with Specialist 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.08 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.13 0.15 0.09 -0.05 0.000
Maternal soft tissue disorder
Matched with Specialist 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.01 0.079
Mismatched with Avoider 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.000
Pregnancy-related severe hypertension
Matched with Specialist 0.37 0.31 0.48 0.17 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.002
Antepartum bleeding
Matched with Specialist 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.11 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.000
Multiples (twins)
Matched with Specialist 0.30 0.21 0.48 0.28 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.000
Herpes
Matched with Specialist 0.36 0.30 0.47 0.17 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.342
Unengaged fetal head
Matched with Specialist 0.43 0.43 0.41 -0.02 0.014
Mismatched with Avoider 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.000
Uterine scarring
Matched with Specialist 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.03 0.065
Mismatched with Avoider 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.120
Congenital anomaly or chromosomal abnormality
Matched with Specialist 0.47 0.43 0.54 0.11 0.000
Mismatched with Avoider 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unweighted average
Matched with Specialist 0.35 0.30 0.43 0.12
Mismatched with Avoider 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.01
Practice Type
Table 3: Extent of Matching and Mismatching for High-Risk Patients on Weekdays, by Health Condition 



























Low risk patient * specialist (σ2) -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.009* 0.011*** 0.002 -0.001 0.008*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Low risk patient * avoider (σ3) -0.005*** -0.003 -0.004** -0.006** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
High risk patient * specialist (σ4) 0.004 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.007 0.024 0.107 0.013 -0.095 0.008 -0.094**
[0.007] [0.009] [0.015] [0.018] [0.014] [0.031] [0.232] [0.028] [0.061] [0.019] [0.042]
High risk patient * avoider (σ5) -0.002 0.004 -0.012 0.020 0.043 -0.006 0.078 0.025 -0.098 0.042 -0.054
[0.005] [0.007] [0.011] [0.029] [0.027] [0.023] [0.207] [0.029] [0.060] [0.037] [0.049]
N 41309 38032 39691 22899 28662 23174 21833 19600 16200 22318 23308
R
2 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.030 0.017 0.015 0.013
(σ3) - (σ2) -0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 0.008 -0.014 -0.003 0 -0.007
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]** [0.004]* [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]*** [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
(σ4) - (σ5) 0.006 0.011 0.028 -0.004 -0.036 0.029 0.028 -0.012 0.003 -0.034 -0.041
[0.007] [0.010] [0.013]** [0.031] [0.029] [0.032] [0.302] [0.038] [0.020] [0.039] [0.033]
Mean of dependent variable for 
high risk patients 0.0459 0.0289 0.0681 0.0567 0.0444 0.0716 0.190 0.0402 0.0650 0.0422 0.0760
Mean of dependent variable for 
low risk patients 0.0261 0.0289 0.0319 0.0309 0.0274 0.0267 0.0289 0.0268 0.0283 0.0300 0.0271
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Ordinary least squares results for incremental length of stay due to major complications, controlling for group practice fixed effects, state, year, and 
patient and physician characteristics listed in the text.  To account for heteroskedasticity, each observation is weighted by the inverse of the standard error 
of the dependent variable, which is the prediction from an auxiliary regression.







Group - (Solo & 
Homogeneous 
Group) P-value
Any of 12 risk factors
Mismatched with Specialist 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.04 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.34 0.37 0.30 -0.07 0.000
Preterm gestation
Mismatched with Specialist 0.17 0.14 0.24 0.10 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.01 0.000
Any hypertension
Mismatched with Specialist 0.21 0.16 0.29 0.13 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.29 0.29 0.27 -0.02 0.000
Malpositioned fetus
Mismatched with Specialist 0.15 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.04 0.000
Macrosomia
Mismatched with Specialist 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.29 0.32 0.22 -0.10 0.000
Maternal soft tissue disorder
Mismatched with Specialist 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.02 0.000
Pregnancy-related severe hypertension
Mismatched with Specialist 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.04 0.000
Antepartum bleeding
Mismatched with Specialist 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.000
Multiples (twins)
Mismatched with Specialist 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.15 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.000
Herpes
Mismatched with Specialist 0.16 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.000
Unengaged fetal head
Mismatched with Specialist 0.16 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.29 0.23 0.38 0.15 0.000
Uterine scarring
Mismatched with Specialist 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.05 0.000
Congenital anomaly or chromosomal abnormality
Mismatched with Specialist 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.000
Matched with Avoider 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.10 0.000
Unweighted average
Mismatched with Specialist 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.08
Matched with Avoider 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.05
Practice Type























Percentage of C-section Deliveries in Florida by Type, 1992-2004








% of deliveries 
where woman 
labors
Note: a delivery during which a woman does not labor is classified as a scheduled c-section.  If a woman 





























Percentage of C-section Deliveries in New York by Type, 1992-2004
88.0% 88.8%                          83.9% 78.7%
% of deliveries 
where woman 
labors
Note: a delivery during which a woman does not labor is classified as a scheduled c-section.  If a woman 





g > σg 77 75
Groups with σ
d
g < σg 75 77








P-value [0.006] [0.015] [0.006]
Table 6: Matching on Physician Style
Notes: All analyses restricted to groups that randomly pair patients and physicians on 
weekends, as measured by patient's predicted cesarean-section propensity.
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients to Test Mechanism of Sorting on Patient Preferences 
(N=407 physicians)
Panel A. Group-level ratio of the weekday to weekend intra-group 
variances in physicians' risk-adjusted c-section rates (N=152 groups)




js Q Q −Correlation coefficient (ξjc – ξgc)
Matching on observed clinical characteristics
-0.091
P-value from 1-sided test [0.033]
Matching on unobserved preferences
-0.093
P-value from 1-sided test [0.030]
Correlation coefficient
-0.057
P-value from 1-sided test [0.125]
-0.073
P-value from 1-sided test [0.071]
Notes: All analyses restricted to physicians in groups that 
randomly pair patients and physicians on weekends, as 
measured by patient's predicted cesarean-section propensity.
Panel A: Matching based on a physician's absolute 
advantage for cesarean sections, relative to the group 
average (N=407 physicians)
Panel B: Matching based on a physician's comparative 
advantage for cesarean sections, relative to the group 
average (N=407 physicians)

































js β β −Appendix A: Creating a Continuous Health Outcome Variable for the Mother’s Health
Major Complication Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Secondary thrombocytopenia 0.489 0.147 0.626 0.230 0.162 0.092 0.265 0.161
Acute edema of lung 2.808 0.183 2.736 0.200 3.206 0.215 2.062 0.222
Urinary complications 0.419 0.194 0.723 0.285 0.992 0.221 1.374 0.387
Puncture or laceration by an instrument 0.767 0.237 0.581 0.168 0.766 0.260 0.625 0.177
Respiratory failure 4.856 0.299 3.592 0.233 2.888 0.326 3.358 0.289
3rd degree perineal laceration 0.153 0.013 0.131 0.010
4th degree perineal laceration 0.228 0.019 0.168 0.017
Laceration of the cervix 0.434 0.048 0.402 0.035
High vaginal laceration 0.131 0.019 0.103 0.019
Injury to pelvic organs -0.031 0.015 -0.023 0.014
3rd stage post-partum hemorrhage 0.513 0.044 1.486 0.163 0.638 0.035 0.871 0.125
Post-partum hemorrhage w/in 24 hours 0.331 0.017 0.313 0.061 0.301 0.015 0.344 0.056
Delayed post-partum hemorrhaging 0.663 0.042 0.872 0.272 0.519 0.039 1.025 0.219
Coagulation defects 0.682 0.065 0.835 0.103 0.705 0.060 0.739 0.098
Anesthesia complication 0.989 0.121 0.613 0.173 0.557 0.080 0.356 0.126
Major puerperal infection 1.752 0.060 1.745 0.046 2.093 0.042 1.612 0.033
Complication of OB surgical wound 0.839 0.085 1.060 0.068 0.719 0.075 1.166 0.051
Hemorrhage or hematoma 0.945 0.247 0.340 0.197 0.046 0.353 0.393 0.214
Other complications 1.621 0.119 1.140 0.183 1.397 0.094 1.514 0.160
Acute anemia due to loss of blood 0.299 0.035 0.308 0.042
Respiratory failure 3.197 0.429 2.820 0.408
Cardiac complications 1.042 0.385 0.861 0.256
Respiratory complications 1.152 0.207 1.108 0.268
Gastrointestinal complications 1.393 0.140 1.576 0.148
Anemia following the delivery 0.111 0.034 0.347 0.027
Retained placenta 0.219 0.184 0.545 0.153
Other OB wound surgical complication 1.026 0.082 1.119 0.073
Disruption of c-section wound 0.893 0.117 1.210 0.086
Postoperative infection 2.471 0.280 2.644 0.368
Other specified complications 1.039 0.163 1.286 0.227
Any Maternal Labor Dummy 0.319 0.012 0.355 0.010




Notes: Models include hospital fixed effects. Standard errors are unadjusted.
New York
Vaginal Delivery C-section Vaginal Delivery C-section
Florida
142,526 44,185 187,211 56,489
0.088 0.151 0.057 0.198Appendix B: OLS Coefficient Estimates of the Likelihood of Receiving a C-section in Florida and New York, 1999-2004
Regressor Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
Patient Age -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001
Patient Age Squared 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
Patient Age is Missing -0.046 0.070 -0.048 0.045 0.021 0.069 0.084 ** 0.041
Patient is Minority 0.004 ** 0.002 0.003 *** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002 0.009 *** 0.001
Patient Minority Status is Missing -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002
Medicaid or Uninsured -0.013 *** 0.002 -0.019 *** 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.002 -0.026 *** 0.001
Previous C-Section Comorbidity 0.130 *** 0.004 0.634 *** 0.001 0.136 *** 0.003 0.601 *** 0.001
Malposition of Fetus Comorbidity 0.287 *** 0.004 0.494 *** 0.002 0.214 *** 0.004 0.487 *** 0.002
Antepartum Bleeding Comorbidity 0.087 *** 0.008 0.327 *** 0.003 0.076 *** 0.008 0.350 *** 0.004
Herpes Cormorbidity 0.010 0.007 0.207 *** 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.211 *** 0.005
Pregnancy-related Severe Hypertension Comorbiditity 0.176 *** 0.010 0.330 *** 0.004 0.188 *** 0.012 0.351 *** 0.005
Uterine Scar Unrelated to C-section Comorbidity 0.240 *** 0.035 0.465 *** 0.009 0.208 *** 0.036 0.490 *** 0.010
Multiple Gestation Comorbidity 0.105 *** 0.011 0.173 *** 0.004 0.072 *** 0.008 0.153 *** 0.004
Macrosomia Comorbidity 0.217 *** 0.005 0.283 *** 0.002 0.189 *** 0.007 0.273 *** 0.003
Unengaged Fetal Head Comorbidity 0.795 *** 0.007 0.675 *** 0.004 0.809 *** 0.006 0.695 *** 0.004
Maternal Soft Tissue Disorder Comorbidity 0.139 *** 0.006 0.178 *** 0.003 0.186 *** 0.006 0.205 *** 0.003
Other Types of Hypertension Comorbidity 0.093 *** 0.003 0.121 *** 0.002 0.079 *** 0.004 0.118 *** 0.002
Preterm Gestation Comorbidity -0.058 *** 0.003 -0.012 *** 0.002 -0.045 *** 0.003 -0.012 *** 0.002
Congenital Fetal CNS Anomaly or Chromosomal 
Abnormality Comorbidity 0.019 0.028 0.152 *** 0.013 -0.011 0.030 0.210 *** 0.015
Cerebral Hemorrhage Comorbidity 0.368 * 0.200 0.172 *** 0.060 -0.118 0.186 0.304 *** 0.070
Asthma Comorbidity 0.025 *** 0.006 0.036 *** 0.003 0.031 *** 0.005 0.036 *** 0.003
Maternal Renal Abnormality Comorbidity 0.007 0.024 0.054 *** 0.011 0.060 ** 0.025 0.062 *** 0.013
Maternal Liver Abnormality Comorbidity 0.032 0.026 0.044 *** 0.014 -0.032 0.029 0.006 0.018
Diabetes or Abnormal Glucose Tolerance Comorbidity -0.005 0.008 0.036 *** 0.004 0.015 0.011 0.079 *** 0.007
Maternal Thyroid Abnormality Comorbidity 0.008 0.008 0.024 *** 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.015 *** 0.003
Maternal Substance Abuse -0.006 0.019 0.003 0.012 -0.018 0.011 -0.024 *** 0.008
Mental Disorder Comorbidity -0.015 *** 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.013 *** 0.003
Maternal Congenital and Other Heart Disease 
Comorbidity 0.017 ** 0.007 0.022 *** 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.019 *** 0.004
Isoimmunization Comorbidity -0.011 * 0.006 -0.006 * 0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.003
Intrauterine Fetal Demise Comorbidity -0.109 *** 0.042 -0.275 *** 0.025 -0.056 0.050 -0.163 *** 0.026
Intrauterine Growth Restriction Comorbidity 0.000 0.009 0.107 *** 0.003 0.020 ** 0.010 0.109 *** 0.004
Oligohydramnios Comorbidity 0.146 *** 0.012 0.143 *** 0.005 0.133 *** 0.012 0.125 *** 0.006
Polyhydramnios Comorbidity 0.075 *** 0.007 0.122 *** 0.003 0.075 *** 0.005 0.094 *** 0.002
Ruptured Membrane > 24 hrs Comorbidity 0.082 *** 0.006 0.046 *** 0.004 0.091 *** 0.005 0.038 *** 0.003
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Weekend Laboring Deliveries All Weekday Deliveries
Florida New York
Weekend Laboring Deliveries All Weekday DeliveriesAppendix B (continued): OLS Coefficient Estimates of the Likelihood of Receiving a C-section in Florida and New York, 1999-2004
Regressor Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
Chorioamnionitis Comorbidity 0.218 *** 0.005 0.209 *** 0.003 0.271 *** 0.005 0.262 *** 0.004
Other Maternal Infection Comorbidity 0.111 *** 0.006 0.078 *** 0.004 0.100 *** 0.006 0.077 *** 0.005
Uterine Rupture Comorbidity 0.469 *** 0.045 0.197 *** 0.016 0.466 *** 0.034 0.229 *** 0.017
Maternal Hypotension or Obstetrical Shock Comorbidity -0.009 0.024 0.045 *** 0.012 0.032 0.023 0.052 *** 0.014
Pulmonary Embolism Comorbidity 0.128 0.142 0.332 *** 0.066 0.383 *** 0.108 0.303 *** 0.051
Year = 2000 0.002 0.002 0.014 *** 0.001 0.006 ** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002
Year = 2001 0.012 *** 0.003 0.032 *** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.022 *** 0.002
Year = 2002 0.017 *** 0.003 0.050 *** 0.002 0.009 *** 0.002 0.032 *** 0.002
Year = 2003 0.019 *** 0.003 0.069 *** 0.002 0.010 *** 0.002 0.041 *** 0.002
Year = 2004 0.028 *** 0.003 0.082 *** 0.002 0.014 *** 0.002 0.056 *** 0.002
Intercept 0.102 *** 0.031 0.167 *** 0.017 0.062 ** 0.027 0.174 *** 0.035
N Deliveries 150,124 708,692 162,571 618,769
R-squared 0.17 0.43 0.18 0.43
All Weekday Deliveries
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a delivery was by c-section. All models include physician fixed effects. Indicators are also included for whether a 
patient’s race is missing and whether her age is missing. 
Florida New York
Weekend Laboring Deliveries All Weekday Deliveries Weekend Laboring Deliveries